Bil Roggio, who blogs on The Fourth Rail, embedded with the Marines in Fallujah. The plan was to start in Fallujah and then move on to Ramadi, currently the most dangerous place in Iraq. Due to transportaion logistics which would have required two wasted days of downtime, Bill has decided to stay on in Fallujah. If James Baker of the illfated ISG and their 79 useless recommendations for succes in Iraq had bothered to come to Fallujah, perhaps they might have come up with some realistic recommendations. Bill has some.
The Military Transition Teams and the Development Iraqi Army
The MTT Mission; Successes and setbacks with the Iraqi Army
While critics of the Iraq Army continue to question the capabilities of the units and soldiers, a real move towards operational independence is occurring within the Iraqi Army. Last year, I embedded with the 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines (the Teufelhunden) in Husaybah, as well as the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines (The Raiders) in the Haditha Triad. The 3/6 was working with the 1st Battalion, 1st Brigade, 1st Division of the Iraqi Army, the most seasoned unit in the Army, while the 3/1 worked with the 7th Division, the greenest unit in the Iraqi Army. In western Anbar, a platoon of Marines paired up with a platoon of Iraqi Army soldiers in small outposts called Battle Positions. The Iraqi Army patrolled jointly with the Marines, and were directly dependent on the Marines for food, supplies, ammunition and transport.
The relationship between the Marines and the Iraqi Army has changed over the past year. The 1st Iraqi Army Division is now in the Fallujah region, and the 1st Brigade's sister unit, the 2nd Brigade, is now operating independently, with embedded Marine Military Transition Teams. Major David McCombs, the executive officer of the 3-2-1 MTT, said their mission is to “advise, assist and mentor the Iraqi Army, and what they do with this is up to them.” There is 1 MTT at the brigade level, and 1 MTT for each of the 3 light infantry battalions in the brigade.
The Marines of the 3rd Recon Military Transition Team (or MTT), advises the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Brigade of the 1st Division (3-2-1). The 3-2-1 MTT is made up of 15 personnel (11 trained MTTs with 4 augment Marines), who are embedded withing an Iraqi battalion (about 500 troops).
The MTT team is modeled after Special Forces teams, as training a foreign military force is a classic Special Forces mission. The team is top heavy with officers and senior non-commissioned officers. The 3-2-1 MTT is made up of 2 majors, 1 captain, 3 1st lieutenants, 2 gunnery sergeants, 1 staff sergeant and 2 sergeants. They live and work side by side with the Iraqi Army. The size of the unit and the unique, specialized mission causes the officers and senior enlisted to take on non-traditional roles such as drivers and gunners for convoys through the city on a daily basis.
Read the rest: http://billroggio.com/archives/2006/12/the_military_transit.php#more
Tuesday, December 19, 2006
Friday, December 15, 2006
Five Months in The MOG
Michael Yon's Frontline Forum is a place where Soldiers can share their experinces. SGT Michael Waller served five months in Mogadishu during the period imortalized in the book and film Black Hawk Down.
5 Months In MOG
By Michael Waller
Veteran - Army
In August of ’93, I was at home in Michigan on a four day pass from my unit, the 227th General Supply (GS) Company, 1st Corps Support Command, headquartered at Ft. Campbell, KY, spending time with my son and my friends before our deployment to Somalia.
I remember getting a lot of questions about where I was going from my son Andrew, who was four at the time; many of which I couldn't answer out of pure ignorance. We found Somalia on the globe and I pointed to it, telling him it was right in the Indian Ocean. Andrew studied the globe and said, “I bet there are a lot of sharks.” The four day pass went by quickly and the time came to say good-bye to my son, my family and friends, and I drove the eight hours back to Ft. Campbell.
The train-up for Somalia at Ft. Campbell included a lot of time at ranges for all types of weapons, as well as convoy operations, field sanitation and combat life saver certifications. It seemed to us that the senior leaders were taking this deployment seriously.
On Aug. 17th, we were told to band and secure our wall lockers in the barracks, and be ready to fly within a two-hour window. That window came and went, and we were told the delay had to do with the possibility that the Somalis might have some type of SAM (surface to air missile), and that the flight had been canceled until further notice. We had already turned in our linen and slept on the bunks that night with no blankets. My roommate and best friend, Specialist (SPC) Mike Morrison, a tall kid from Marshalltown, Iowa, was still snoring when the alarm on my watch went off. Morrrison answered to his nickname, “Junior,” while off duty.
“Junior get up, we missed the flight!” I yelled.
He stumbled out of the rack looking for his glasses. I laughed and pointed at him.
“Dude relax, it's 0600 - let’s go to chow.”
Junior was not too happy about his wake-up call and was mumbling something about “dickhead” and “payback,” under his breath on the way to chow.
Our company was going to be escorting and delivering food and rations to units all over Somalia. As the Operations Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO), I was going to Somalia as advance-party with several other NCO's and one Specialist/E-4, my “hootch-mate,” Junior. On Aug. 18th, at 1400 hours, we took the five-minute bus ride to the airfield at Ft. Campbell, boarded a C-141 transport plane, and took off on a 21-hour flight to Mogadishu, Somalia - otherwise known as “MOG.”
Read the rest here:http://www.michaelyon-online.com/flf/article.php?msg=1&ID=15
5 Months In MOG
By Michael Waller
Veteran - Army
In August of ’93, I was at home in Michigan on a four day pass from my unit, the 227th General Supply (GS) Company, 1st Corps Support Command, headquartered at Ft. Campbell, KY, spending time with my son and my friends before our deployment to Somalia.
I remember getting a lot of questions about where I was going from my son Andrew, who was four at the time; many of which I couldn't answer out of pure ignorance. We found Somalia on the globe and I pointed to it, telling him it was right in the Indian Ocean. Andrew studied the globe and said, “I bet there are a lot of sharks.” The four day pass went by quickly and the time came to say good-bye to my son, my family and friends, and I drove the eight hours back to Ft. Campbell.
The train-up for Somalia at Ft. Campbell included a lot of time at ranges for all types of weapons, as well as convoy operations, field sanitation and combat life saver certifications. It seemed to us that the senior leaders were taking this deployment seriously.
On Aug. 17th, we were told to band and secure our wall lockers in the barracks, and be ready to fly within a two-hour window. That window came and went, and we were told the delay had to do with the possibility that the Somalis might have some type of SAM (surface to air missile), and that the flight had been canceled until further notice. We had already turned in our linen and slept on the bunks that night with no blankets. My roommate and best friend, Specialist (SPC) Mike Morrison, a tall kid from Marshalltown, Iowa, was still snoring when the alarm on my watch went off. Morrrison answered to his nickname, “Junior,” while off duty.
“Junior get up, we missed the flight!” I yelled.
He stumbled out of the rack looking for his glasses. I laughed and pointed at him.
“Dude relax, it's 0600 - let’s go to chow.”
Junior was not too happy about his wake-up call and was mumbling something about “dickhead” and “payback,” under his breath on the way to chow.
Our company was going to be escorting and delivering food and rations to units all over Somalia. As the Operations Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO), I was going to Somalia as advance-party with several other NCO's and one Specialist/E-4, my “hootch-mate,” Junior. On Aug. 18th, at 1400 hours, we took the five-minute bus ride to the airfield at Ft. Campbell, boarded a C-141 transport plane, and took off on a 21-hour flight to Mogadishu, Somalia - otherwise known as “MOG.”
Read the rest here:http://www.michaelyon-online.com/flf/article.php?msg=1&ID=15
Thursday, December 14, 2006
Doug Beazley Embedded With Canadian Troops in Afghanistan
Sun Media is one Canadian MSM that gets the War on Terror. They have sent Doug Beazley to cover the great job the troops are doin. In an email to me Doug wrote: "Personally I don't think the average Canadian knows how hard these guys work. I've got nothing but respect for them, and I pray they all make it home. DBZ" Me too. What follows is one of his posts:
Here comes trouble!
Abdoul Guindo has a knack for living dangerously
By DOUG BEAZLEY, SUN MEDIA
KANDAHAR, AFGHANISTAN -- In the Force Protection unit at Kandahar Airfield, Sgt. Abdoul Guindo has an unrivalled reputation as a little one-man island of bad karma.
He's been here since August, leading convoys to and from the far-flung coalition outposts dotting the landscape around Kandahar City. He's been bombed, strafed and mortared at least 12 times ... maybe more. He lost count a couple of weeks ago.
"I prefer the phrase 'living legend' to 'crap magnet,' " he said, cackling.
He's 28, lives in Ottawa, just got married over a year ago. His wife just had a daughter, their first.
"I stopped counting after the first two attacks. I guess there's a kind of stigma that sticks with me. Our unit gets hit all the time."
Read the rest about the amzing Sergeant Abdoul Guindo here: http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/War_Terror/CanadaAtWar/2006/12/13/2770748-sun.html
Here comes trouble!
Abdoul Guindo has a knack for living dangerously
By DOUG BEAZLEY, SUN MEDIA
KANDAHAR, AFGHANISTAN -- In the Force Protection unit at Kandahar Airfield, Sgt. Abdoul Guindo has an unrivalled reputation as a little one-man island of bad karma.
He's been here since August, leading convoys to and from the far-flung coalition outposts dotting the landscape around Kandahar City. He's been bombed, strafed and mortared at least 12 times ... maybe more. He lost count a couple of weeks ago.
"I prefer the phrase 'living legend' to 'crap magnet,' " he said, cackling.
He's 28, lives in Ottawa, just got married over a year ago. His wife just had a daughter, their first.
"I stopped counting after the first two attacks. I guess there's a kind of stigma that sticks with me. Our unit gets hit all the time."
Read the rest about the amzing Sergeant Abdoul Guindo here: http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/War_Terror/CanadaAtWar/2006/12/13/2770748-sun.html
Wednesday, December 13, 2006
Teflon Don's Accute Politics
I've completely stopped being surprised by the talent of many of the American Soldiers fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan possess. The very fact that they are in the front lines but find time to share intelligent thoughts with us regarding the war is remarkable. What follows is a reprint of a remarkable post by a remarkable young Soldier who goes by the handle of Teflon Don:
Saturday, December 09, 2006
The First Bone
Last night I sat alone on the porch and studied the pieces of a puzzle. It had come in a care package from home, and consisted of six small pieces of wood, of equal dimensions, with differing types of slots cut across them. I have no idea what the puzzle is supposed to look like, but I'm still trying to assemble the wooden bones into some coherent whole. As the parts move in my hands, they occasionally form into larger shapes, only to collapse because I've failed to incorporate all the parts at my disposal. In some ways, I see the puzzle as an analogy to Iraq. Many pieces must grow and fit together, or the nation that grows on them will eventually tumble and fall. I continue to stare at the bones of the puzzle, and begin to associate them with the forces that strive together attempting to form Iraq. The Military, The Media, Government, Religion. Other pieces lie on the table unnamed, representing forces I remain unaware of.
Over the next week or two, I plan on taking a post here and there to explain my opinions on these. I don't have a thesis or much of a rational, convincing argument; just thoughts spewed out on paper. First, I'll tackle The Military.
First, a sidenote:One of my biggest pet peeves is the attitude that says "Support the troops: Bring them home!". Last time I checked, the troops are all volunteers. Of course, that might change if Rep. Rangel gets his way and reinstates the draft, but for now, we've all chosen this life. If you claim to support the troops, listen to me: we do not want to be used as a political weapon. If we pull military forces out of Iraq before the Iraqis are fully capable of managing their own affairs, if we go home and leave Iraq in a downward spiral, if we fail in this task of nation building that we find ourselves at, then we doom the American military to a long period of even greater risks. It's your choice not to support the war; just don't pretend to support the troops while using them as a political tool.
Back on track:My area of operations in Eastern Anbar is largely free of the sectarian violence that plagues Baghdad and other areas of Iraq. The large Sunni population trades religious violence for killings directed against coalition forces and fellow Sunnis judged to be too friendly with CF or Shia government officials in Baghdad. Even if the CF were to leave Iraq, violence would continue among the Sunnis, who have been historically marginalized by powerful Shia in the new government.
Various talking heads stateside have been repeating the view that there is no military solution to the conflict in Iraq. In large part I agree: we can't simply kill all the insurgents, because in the process we create more insurgents. Even if we managed to kill them all, there are many factions who do not desire the same ends for Iraq. However, without some sort of partial military solution and a stable, violence-free environment, we cannot expect any lasting political solution. Iraqi forces are not ready to assume sole control of the country- the military is getting better, and in some areas operates outside of US control, but the police are plagued by widespread corruption. Something like 70% of police across the country have militia ties, according to the AP- not something you want if you're trying to enforce justice equally across all factions. Even the professionals in the military have reliability problems: in case you were wondering just how the best soldiers in the Iraqi army feel about the current political climate, The Times is there.
Obviously, "Stay the course" will lead us nowhere. Small wonder. It's a basic principle of counterinsurgency that no operation will succeed without the troops involved getting out among the local population, giving them a chance to associate and identify with their protectors. The current strategy tends more towards limiting "face time" with the locals because of the danger involved, preferring to spend more time behind berms and barb wire. Units that engage the local populace have enjoyed greater success in fighting the insurgency, as the British in the south have shown. If "Stay the course" isn't the answer, neither is "Set your course across the Atlantic". My chief fear now is that the military will not be allowed to pursue a course beneficial to Iraq, and will eventually be brought home with the job undone.
I never figured out how the puzzle went together.
http://acutepolitics.blogspot.com/
Saturday, December 09, 2006
The First Bone
Last night I sat alone on the porch and studied the pieces of a puzzle. It had come in a care package from home, and consisted of six small pieces of wood, of equal dimensions, with differing types of slots cut across them. I have no idea what the puzzle is supposed to look like, but I'm still trying to assemble the wooden bones into some coherent whole. As the parts move in my hands, they occasionally form into larger shapes, only to collapse because I've failed to incorporate all the parts at my disposal. In some ways, I see the puzzle as an analogy to Iraq. Many pieces must grow and fit together, or the nation that grows on them will eventually tumble and fall. I continue to stare at the bones of the puzzle, and begin to associate them with the forces that strive together attempting to form Iraq. The Military, The Media, Government, Religion. Other pieces lie on the table unnamed, representing forces I remain unaware of.
Over the next week or two, I plan on taking a post here and there to explain my opinions on these. I don't have a thesis or much of a rational, convincing argument; just thoughts spewed out on paper. First, I'll tackle The Military.
First, a sidenote:One of my biggest pet peeves is the attitude that says "Support the troops: Bring them home!". Last time I checked, the troops are all volunteers. Of course, that might change if Rep. Rangel gets his way and reinstates the draft, but for now, we've all chosen this life. If you claim to support the troops, listen to me: we do not want to be used as a political weapon. If we pull military forces out of Iraq before the Iraqis are fully capable of managing their own affairs, if we go home and leave Iraq in a downward spiral, if we fail in this task of nation building that we find ourselves at, then we doom the American military to a long period of even greater risks. It's your choice not to support the war; just don't pretend to support the troops while using them as a political tool.
Back on track:My area of operations in Eastern Anbar is largely free of the sectarian violence that plagues Baghdad and other areas of Iraq. The large Sunni population trades religious violence for killings directed against coalition forces and fellow Sunnis judged to be too friendly with CF or Shia government officials in Baghdad. Even if the CF were to leave Iraq, violence would continue among the Sunnis, who have been historically marginalized by powerful Shia in the new government.
Various talking heads stateside have been repeating the view that there is no military solution to the conflict in Iraq. In large part I agree: we can't simply kill all the insurgents, because in the process we create more insurgents. Even if we managed to kill them all, there are many factions who do not desire the same ends for Iraq. However, without some sort of partial military solution and a stable, violence-free environment, we cannot expect any lasting political solution. Iraqi forces are not ready to assume sole control of the country- the military is getting better, and in some areas operates outside of US control, but the police are plagued by widespread corruption. Something like 70% of police across the country have militia ties, according to the AP- not something you want if you're trying to enforce justice equally across all factions. Even the professionals in the military have reliability problems: in case you were wondering just how the best soldiers in the Iraqi army feel about the current political climate, The Times is there.
Obviously, "Stay the course" will lead us nowhere. Small wonder. It's a basic principle of counterinsurgency that no operation will succeed without the troops involved getting out among the local population, giving them a chance to associate and identify with their protectors. The current strategy tends more towards limiting "face time" with the locals because of the danger involved, preferring to spend more time behind berms and barb wire. Units that engage the local populace have enjoyed greater success in fighting the insurgency, as the British in the south have shown. If "Stay the course" isn't the answer, neither is "Set your course across the Atlantic". My chief fear now is that the military will not be allowed to pursue a course beneficial to Iraq, and will eventually be brought home with the job undone.
I never figured out how the puzzle went together.
http://acutepolitics.blogspot.com/
Wednesday, November 22, 2006
The Return of Red2Alpha
I originally started this blog after discovering Colby Buzzell's blog 'MY WAR: Fear and Loathing in Iraq'. I created the blog so that I could communicate with CB and, what the hell decided to write something to see how this works. I'm not a natural writer like CB, who has subsequently published a book called, naturally, 'MY WAR'.
Since that time I have followed the Milblogs of a number of American Soldiers serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. The general public's view, thanks to people such as John Kerry, is that Infantry Soldiers and Marines are uneducated and unintelligent. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Those who blog tend to be very intelligent, insightful and multi-talented. Buck Sargent and Tim Boggs are two of the best examples of this.
Another example was a blog called 'This is Your War' by Red2Alpha. R2A is a natural writer whose style and content was gripping. I copied one of his post's 'Saying Goodbye' here on April 12, 2005. It's very powerful. You can read it here:http://membrain.blogspot.com/2005_04_01_membrain_archive.html
Shortly after that post was written Red2Alpha's blog was shut down for reasons of OPSEC. The post itself lived on here and was also picked up by Mark Partridge Miner of 'Boots in Baghdad' fame.
Now Red2Alpha is back blogging and he is definetly a writer those of you who follow Milblogs should be reading. R2A had a very tough tour of Iraq and some very bad personal experiences upon his return home. He is still serving as he works his way through some serious PTSD issues. He's getting a lot of support from the likes of Papa Ray, Blackfive and Uncle Jimbo as well as former readers and new ones. It was while reading Blackfive that I was alerted to R2A's return.
Red2Alpha is worthy of your support. Read him here: http://thisisyourwarii.blogspot.com/
Since that time I have followed the Milblogs of a number of American Soldiers serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. The general public's view, thanks to people such as John Kerry, is that Infantry Soldiers and Marines are uneducated and unintelligent. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Those who blog tend to be very intelligent, insightful and multi-talented. Buck Sargent and Tim Boggs are two of the best examples of this.
Another example was a blog called 'This is Your War' by Red2Alpha. R2A is a natural writer whose style and content was gripping. I copied one of his post's 'Saying Goodbye' here on April 12, 2005. It's very powerful. You can read it here:http://membrain.blogspot.com/2005_04_01_membrain_archive.html
Shortly after that post was written Red2Alpha's blog was shut down for reasons of OPSEC. The post itself lived on here and was also picked up by Mark Partridge Miner of 'Boots in Baghdad' fame.
Now Red2Alpha is back blogging and he is definetly a writer those of you who follow Milblogs should be reading. R2A had a very tough tour of Iraq and some very bad personal experiences upon his return home. He is still serving as he works his way through some serious PTSD issues. He's getting a lot of support from the likes of Papa Ray, Blackfive and Uncle Jimbo as well as former readers and new ones. It was while reading Blackfive that I was alerted to R2A's return.
Red2Alpha is worthy of your support. Read him here: http://thisisyourwarii.blogspot.com/
Thursday, September 28, 2006
More on Operation Medusa: Afghanistan
I recently came across a blog called On Point which deals with counter terrorism. It published two articles regarding Operation Medusa. One was by the Globe and Mail reporter GRAEME SMITH and the other was from The Sunday Times' Michael Smith. To be honest I just skimmed the article from the Globe as the have an Anti-war agenda and will try to put any actions by Canadian Troops in a negative light. I made a comment to that affect, as you will see below. I used to be a voracious reader of current events and would a times read all 4 of Toronto's dailies on a regular basis. Now I only read one, The National Post (which does support the troops by the way) and supplement my interest in current events by reading various blogs. On Point is goin on the list.
One commenter, J C Rawley took exception to my comment and responded that the Globe and Mail was a right wing paper!! and even more absurdly insisted that the Bush hating New York Times was actually a Bush supporter!?!? (For more on NYT see Tim Boggs Letter to the New York Times reprinted here: you'll have to scoll down as my profile has mysteriously dropped to the bottom of the page.)I don't know what part of the planet JC Rawley is from , nor do I care but he's just wrong.
The reason I'm posting this is that CPT Thomas C. Nield an Information Operations Officer with the Canadian Army who was involved in the planning of Operation Medusa made a couple of comments. I was most interested that the Canadian Army is that on top of things. I went back and read Graeme Smith's article in full, and while it puts a negative spin on things to keep his publisher happy it is in fact correct as CPT Nield makse clear.
The two article and On Point's intro follow:
ON Point Blog
Operation Medusa in Afghanistan: Two Different Views
Readers are probably noticing a trend. At ON Point, one of the things we enjoy doing is highlighting when reports come in from the field that say two different things. This isn't so we can judge or play "gotcha" with the correspondent. On today's battlefield, finding accurate information is almost as tough for the journalist as it is for an intelligence professional. But by pointing out the differences, we often find the more accurate picture.
Our latest find comes courtesy of an individual who has spent a lot of time in dirty, nasty parts of the world. This person found two reports from Canadian newspapers about Operation Medusa, a recent sweep against the Taliban.
Two different pictures emerged. Decide for yourself which one is more accurate:
Inspiring tale of triumph over Taliban not all it seems
GRAEME SMITH
From Saturday's Globe and Mail
The official story of Operation Medusa has been repeated many times in recent days, after NATO declared success with its biggest offensive to date in Afghanistan.
In speeches from Kabul to Washington, military commanders described the two-week campaign as a simple, clear-cut triumph: The Taliban entrenched themselves in a swath of terrain, terrorizing local villagers; Canadian soldiers led a massive assault, killing more than 1,000 Taliban and routing others; and now villagers are welcoming the return of government rule. Military officials say the operation may have destroyed up to one third of the insurgency's hardcore ranks.
It's an inspiring tale, as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization calls on members for more troops and struggles to gain support for the war.
But interviews with tribal elders, farmers and senior officials in the city of Kandahar suggest a version of events that is more complicated, and less reassuring.
Related to this article
Many of the fighters killed — perhaps half of them, by one estimate — were not Taliban stalwarts, but local farmers who reportedly revolted against corrupt policing and tribal persecution. It appears the Taliban did not choose the Panjwai district as a battleground merely because the irrigation trenches and dry canals provided good hiding places, but because many villagers were willing to give them food, shelter — even sons for the fight — in exchange for freedom from the local authorities.
The government has regained control of this restive district southwest of Kandahar city, and has promised to muster donations from Canada and other countries to rebuild. The Canadian military says it will help local security forces establish a new base to make sure the Taliban do not return to Panjwai.
But there are troubling signs that the area may be sliding back toward the same conditions that sparked the violent revolt.
Unconfirmed reports suggest that Taliban fighters continue to lurk around the district, and that police in the area have resumed the abusive tactics that originally ignited local anger. Farmers say gangs of policemen, often their tribal rivals, have swept into Panjwai behind the Canadian troops to search for valuables. They have been described ransacking homes, burning shops and conducting shakedowns at checkpoints.
"This is a case of bad governance," said Talatbek Masadykov, head of the United Nations mission in southern Afghanistan.
"Maybe half of these so-called anti-government elements acting here in this area of the south, they had to join this Taliban movement because of the misbehaviour of these bad guys," Mr. Masadykov said, referring to undisciplined local police.
Police commanders in Kandahar city declined to be interviewed. The allegations from local farmers are difficult to confirm, because it has been only two days since Panjwai was deemed safe enough for civilians to return home, and the area remains too dangerous for Western journalists to visit.
But even politicians who generally support the government concede that the situation in Panjwai was aggravated by the missteps of local authorities.
The most notorious of the blunders was the case of Abdul Razik. Last month, concerned about the growing number of Taliban on the doorstep of Kandahar city, the provincial government assigned Mr. Razik to clear insurgents from Panjwai. Mr. Razik serves as a police commander in Spin Boldak, near the Pakistani border, but his fighters have a reputation as a kind of militia, all drawn from the same tribe: the Achakzai, a branch of the Pashtun ethnic group.
In the borderlands, the Achakzai often feud with another Pashtun tribe, the Noorzai. The two tribes also dominate the strip of farmland in Panjwai where Mr. Razik was dispatched, although the tribes have usually co-existed peacefully — until the arrival of Mr. Razik. Word spread quickly through Panjwai that the police commander intended to kill not only Taliban but any member of the Noorzai tribe; true or not, Mr. Razik soon found himself facing an armed uprising. His men were ambushed southwest of the village of Panjwai District Centre, and many of their bodies were left rotting on the road as Mr. Razik retreated to the borderlands.
But having fought off Mr. Razik, the local Noorzai tribesmen soon ended up fighting his more disciplined colleagues from the police and Afghan National Army.
"This was a bad idea, to bring Abdul Razik," said Haji Mohammed Qassam, a provincial council member in Kandahar with responsibility for security issues.
"One village had 10 or 20 fighters against the government before he came, and the next day, maybe 200."
It was only one example among many complaints cited by people from Panjwai as they described the deteriorating relations between locals and the government. Well before Mr. Razik's arrival, villagers say, they were subject to police stealing their cash, cellphones and watches. Even motorbikes and cars were seized by police patrols, locals say.
Abid, 32, a farmer from the Pashmul area, roughly 15 kilometres southwest of Kandahar, said the thievery by police got so frequent that his friend tried a novel tactic when he encountered a checkpoint two months ago.
Rolling toward a roadblock on a motorbike in the late evening, he said, his friend turned off the motor and started coasting toward the police.
"He took the keys out of the ignition and threw them into the bushes, so they couldn't steal it," Abid said. "This made them angry. They beat him, took his money and his watch. But he kept his bike."
The depredations stopped as the Taliban gained control of the area, villagers said. The insurgents imposed a strict order; some reports suggested they had returned to their habit of cutting off thieves' hands.
Abdul Ahad, 44, a wealthy farmer and landowner from the village of Sangisar, said he appreciated the Taliban, despite the terror he felt every time he passed through one of their checkpoints.
In a recent interview, Mr. Ahad removed a black leather diary from his *** pocket and showed a reporter where he had scribbled a few numbers for government officials. Those numbers could have got him killed, he said, if the Taliban had found the diary during their regular searches at checkpoints, because the fighters would have assumed he is a spy.
Still, risking death at the roadblocks was better, he said, than the random thievery and beatings meted out by the Afghan police.
"The Taliban didn't take any tolls at the checkposts," Mr. Ahad said. "Even when they came to my farm, they did not eat my grapes without permission."
The Taliban also endeared themselves to the locals by returning to their roots as a protest movement. The name Taliban first gained notoriety in Afghanistan in 1992, after a group of religious students started attacking the roadblocks in Panjwai to remove the corrupt jihadi commanders who once waged holy war against the Soviets but had settled into gangsterism after the Soviet withdrawal.
"Policemen [now] are like jihadi commanders in the past," said Mr. Masadykov, at the UN office in Kandahar.
"They are misbehaving sometimes, looting, going to search and at the same time stealing everything in the houses. We are receiving a lot of complaints about it. We have to work on it."
Mr. Qassam said the government has learned from its Panjwai experience and will try to avoid repeating it. Taliban are now infiltrating the Khakrez district, he said, but the government will try sending more disciplined Afghan forces to maintain order, rather than requesting an onslaught of NATO power.
Mr. Qassam also emphasized an aspect of NATO's story about Operation Medusa that few people in Kandahar question: The city itself now feels a little more secure.
The encroaching insurgency had left the educated city dwellers feeling unsafe. Housing prices, and even vehicle prices, were depressed in recent months. Some locals reported rental fees falling as much as ten times lower than last year's rates.
Merchants in the city were even sending packages of phone cards and cash to the Taliban in Panjwai, hoping to curry favour with the insurgents in case they overran the provincial capital, Mr. Qassam said.
"When the Taliban were in Panjwai, all the people in this area were worrying: 'Where will I move my family?'" Mr. Qassam said. "They are more relaxed and happy now."
--------- (an earlier report) -----------
The Sunday Times September 17, 2006
Key strike puts Taliban to flight
Michael Smith, Kandahar
BRITISH special forces have played a key role in a defeat of the Taliban as part of Operation Medusa, the largest combat operation ever mounted by Nato. Over
the past fortnight Nato troops, led by the Canadians, have driven the Taliban out of the strategically important Panjwayi district between Maiwand and
Kandahar.
Last week members of the newly formed British Special Forces Support Group (SFSG) pulled out of their hides to the southeast of Maiwand with their commanders satisfied that the Taliban had been defeated and expelled from the
area.
"They chose to take us on," said a senior Nato officer. "They have suffered heavy casualties. In fact, they haven't suffered such extensive casualties since
the fighting in 2001-02."
The British special forces had spent the first 10 days guarding against any Taliban reinforcement from the west, and the last few picking off fleeing insurgents. Senior officers cautioned that while Operation Medusa had been "a tactical success", there was no room for complacency and nobody was about to use the word victory. "It has a tendency to come back and bite you on the ***," one officer said.
This battlefield has a profound historical resonance. Maiwand was the scene of
one of the most devastating defeats ever suffered by the British when, in July 1880, 2,700 British and Indian troops were outnumbered 10 to one by Afghan tribesmen. More than 1,000 British and Indian troops died but 7,000 of the enemy were killed in what was a pyrrhic victory for the Afghans.
The British suffered losses in the latest battle - 14 dead when a Nimrod spyplane crashed on the first day, including signallers from the Special Boat Service (SBS) and the SFSG who were relaying intelligence collected by RAF colleagues. Five Canadian and two Afghan soldiers were killed on the ground. But Nato claimed that more than 500 Taliban - a third of those making a stand at Panjwayi - were killed.
The Taliban were using the area as a forward operations base to put pressure on the city of Kandahar, which is seen as the key to controlling the south. During the Soviet occupation of the 1980s, the mujaheddin occupied the area, which is covered with grapevines, wheat and poppy fields, making it an ideal supply base for an insurgent army. It is riddled with drainage ditches and high walled compounds providing perfect cover for a marauding guerrilla band and there are scores of escape tunnels and trenches built during the mujaheddin days.
General David Richards, the Nato commander, chose the area to demonstrate to the 70% of the population who, he believes, will back whoever appears stronger, that Nato and not the Taliban is in charge. Richards had prepared the ground
carefully. His commanders talked to tribal leaders to persuade the 40,000
population to leave for their own safety and to convince them that the
alliance would rebuild once the Taliban had left.
The battle, which pitted more than 2,000 troops against 1,500 Taliban, opened on Saturday September 2 with a salvo of gunfire from Canadian and Dutch artillery. A company of 150 men from the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry
advanced across the Arghandab river.
But the Taliban were lying in wait and the company took the brunt of their aggression, coming under intense mortar and machinegun fire that killed four
Canadians. The Canadian commander temporarily withdrew his forces and replaced them with Taskforce Grizzly, comprising 200 Afghan infantry backed up by US troops. On the left flank, Taskforce 31, comprising SBS and US Army Special Forces, were used temporarily to "shape the battlefield", seizing the initiative from the Taliban.
Two other companies of the Princess Patricia's were making slow progress against a Taliban trench system in the north. The third company was redirected to join the push, along with US infantry. They were backed up by direct fire support from Canadian and Dutch artillery and by air support from Apache attack helicopters, US B1 Lancer bombers, F16s, and US A10 Tankbusters - one
of which killed a fifth Canadian soldier with "friendly fire" - plus RAF Harrier GR7s.
While the SBS and the US Special Forces gave the Nato advance a kick-start from the south, other US special operations troops spread across the area to the south of the battlefield. They were ordered to keep out Taliban reinforcements and supply columns attempting to make their way along the desert roads from the Pakistani towns of Nuski and Quetta.
The UK and US special forces boosted the southern advance considerably and after a few days the SBS were withdrawn and reassigned to other tasks. To the north, the Canadians, whose light armoured vehicles were vulnerable to rocket- propelled grenades, were struggling. By the beginning of last week, an operation scheduled to last only 10 days looked like lasting a month.
But sustained aerial and artillery bombardment were beginning to tell on the Taliban. Suddenly one company of the Princess Patricia's made a breakthrough, pushing forward to hold a position well ahead of the Canadian lines. A second company pushed forward and very soon all three Canadian companies were leap-frogging each other to the point that the American infantry could be withdrawn.
The effect was like a vice, squeezing the Taliban out to the west where
they were awaited by Dutch infantry, a Danish armoured reconnaissance
company and, further out towards Maiwand, the British SFSG, mostly former
paratroopers. By the end of last week, the vast majority of the Taliban
were thought to have fled.
Senior Nato officers expressed astonishment that the Taliban had abandoned traditional guerrilla tactics that would have seen them dispersing the minute heavy artillery and aerial firepower were introduced. "The next three to six months is a crucial period here," Richards said. "We are establishing psychological ascendency over the Taliban in Panjwayi. "Operation Medusa has not been about killing for no reason. The people there want to believe we can win and we're
beginning to demonstrate that we will win."
Published Tuesday, September 26, 2006 8:04 AM
Comments
JC Rawley said:
Clearly the world is much more complex than the black/white (or black hats/white hats) version that our Administration keeps repeating like a mantra repeated over and over in some sort of prayer ritual.
The fact is that many of the "terrorists" caught during the original invasion of Afghanistan (and now in Guantanamo or one of the secret CIA prisons) were fighting corruption as in the first case or even shopped out by local warlords as "tribute" to the new invaders to show their loyalty to the new regime.
Afghanistan is probably the poorest country in the world. It seems to have no minerals or even oil to offer the people some sort of respite from the opium growers that seem to bethe only chance at financial independence for the average person.
The Taliban may have been awful people but they had great PR in their country for "doing good" or at least "doing different" from the old regimes.
If we want to defeat the Taliban and their supporters, it will not be done by bombings and massacres alone.
I recommend the Thomas PM Barnett books on the New Pentagon's Map and Bridging the Gap . They will offer, as Col. Hammes book did, a great insight into how we might win more peaces instead of winning wars and losing the peace.
September 26, 2006 10:27 AM
membrain said:
With respect to the article published in the Globe and Mail you have to realize that they have an far left wing anti-war agenda the makes the New York Times look like Neo-Cons!! They are not a credible source for reporting from Afghanistan.
The Britsh Arcticle was the more accurate of the two. The idea that the locals liked the Taliban is pure bulls***! Thes are people that use to hold public executions for such 'crimes' as not having a long enough beard.
September 26, 2006 12:42 PM
JC Rawley said:
Sorry membrain,
The Globe and Mail, Canada's National Newspaper, has a distinctly Right of center point of view.
It is by no means a left wing paper.
It is reporting things you do not like therefore you call it a name.
BTW, the NY Times is one of Bush's biggest supporters. They helped him sell the war and continue to report and support it as one of his better "accomplishments".
Perhaps it is time people put down the Kool-aid and look at the pig with lipstick for what it truly is.
September 26, 2006 1:14 PM
Gary VW said:
A persons "truth" is primarily derived from ones own perceptions.
If all the info that was given to the reporter(s) was factual, & not misconstrued, or reformatted, in any manner, then both stories have some "truth" in them.
September 26, 2006 2:55 PM
CPT Thomas C. Nield said:
I am an Information Operations Officer for TF Aegis (RC-S) and was involved with the planning of Op Medusa. Graeme Smith's article is pretty accurate. The locals of Panjwayi offered support for the Taliban because local governance was corrupt.
As an officer with access to classified material, I have to say that both articles are pretty accurate. I am surprised that the SF involvement (especially British SF) was mentioned because the first rule of fight club is that you don't talk about fight club.
Anyway, the area of Panjwayi is key terrain. It controls access to Kandahar City from the west and it is the only defendable area near Kandahar City. The Russians lost an entire division in the Pashmul area of Panjwayi. NATO forces achieved what the Russians could not.
Op Medusa established the security credentials of ISAF/NATO, the challenge now is Phase 4, Reconstruction. We are trying to get aid in there and to shore up a previously non-existent credible security presence (Afghan and NATO).
Myself and my boss, a Canadian Major, personally escorted media to Pashmul to witness the aid distributions and to give them the opportunity to interview the locals. Graeme Smith elected to not go because he typically likes to interview locals without military guys around. Carlotta Gall (NY Times), Susanne Koelbl (Der Spiegel), Declan Walsh (the Guardian), and Jim (Canadian Broadcasting Co) did go and got the interviews with Grizzly 6 and the locals that they wanted.
The articles Graeme Smith produces are pretty accurate most of the time. He works really hard at getting the locals to open up. Sometimes what he writes causes a little heartburn but we know that he isn't being malicious. Sometimes the truth hurts.
September 26, 2006 3:40 PM
ted mauro said:
I am EXTREMEMLY pleased with both these articles and this site. We need to look at all sources to make the best choices so all our troops can be safe and all our decisions correct. While this isn't always possible it should ever remain our goal for the leaders and the voters of our GREAT nation. Thank you for this service.
September 26, 2006 6:23 PM
ON Point said:
Ted -- Thanks for your kind words about the site. Means a lot to us. We'll keep working to bring you all this important information so that our citizens and warriors can stay proud, strong, and free... and well-informed.
September 26, 2006 9:46 PM
Gary VW said:
Actually Membrain was correct. The "Globe & Mail" a newspaper, I believed based out of Toronto & has a large distribution in several other canadian cities. Now, has a leftist leaning view on its articles, even though its original start was from a conservative (called Tory's in Canada) group.
So, if you read both stories above, remembering that one story leans to the right, & the other to the left, you can find the truth written in both articles, & you can see how the reporters want to guide the reader into seeing the story, from their point of view.
September 27, 2006 8:38 AM
CPT Thomas C. Nield said:
I want to reiterate that both articles are factually correct. There is no left or right leaning. One article focuses on the maneuver part of Op Medusa, the other article is getting local reaction.
The local reaction is spot on. The lack of credible local governance is what led to Op Medusa in the first place and now we are trying to get a credible ANSF and ISAF presence to stay for the long term.
GRaeme Smith ended his article with a good quote from Mr. Qassam. The Kandaharis are in fact breathing easier now that ISAF/NATO has proven that they can stick it to the Taliban.
September 28, 2006 12:29 AM
ON Point said:
CPT Nield,
Thanks for checking back on this link and for confirming the facts on the ground. As mentioned in the initial post, our intent at ON Point is not to play "gotcha", but to raise questions when things don't seem to make sense.
If there's any important information we can ever assist you with distributing, please don't hesitate to contact us directly using the links on the page.
September 28, 2006 11:12 AM
http://uscavonpoint.com/blogs/reconstructing_iraq/archive/2006/09/26/173.aspx
One commenter, J C Rawley took exception to my comment and responded that the Globe and Mail was a right wing paper!! and even more absurdly insisted that the Bush hating New York Times was actually a Bush supporter!?!? (For more on NYT see Tim Boggs Letter to the New York Times reprinted here: you'll have to scoll down as my profile has mysteriously dropped to the bottom of the page.)I don't know what part of the planet JC Rawley is from , nor do I care but he's just wrong.
The reason I'm posting this is that CPT Thomas C. Nield an Information Operations Officer with the Canadian Army who was involved in the planning of Operation Medusa made a couple of comments. I was most interested that the Canadian Army is that on top of things. I went back and read Graeme Smith's article in full, and while it puts a negative spin on things to keep his publisher happy it is in fact correct as CPT Nield makse clear.
The two article and On Point's intro follow:
ON Point Blog
Operation Medusa in Afghanistan: Two Different Views
Readers are probably noticing a trend. At ON Point, one of the things we enjoy doing is highlighting when reports come in from the field that say two different things. This isn't so we can judge or play "gotcha" with the correspondent. On today's battlefield, finding accurate information is almost as tough for the journalist as it is for an intelligence professional. But by pointing out the differences, we often find the more accurate picture.
Our latest find comes courtesy of an individual who has spent a lot of time in dirty, nasty parts of the world. This person found two reports from Canadian newspapers about Operation Medusa, a recent sweep against the Taliban.
Two different pictures emerged. Decide for yourself which one is more accurate:
Inspiring tale of triumph over Taliban not all it seems
GRAEME SMITH
From Saturday's Globe and Mail
The official story of Operation Medusa has been repeated many times in recent days, after NATO declared success with its biggest offensive to date in Afghanistan.
In speeches from Kabul to Washington, military commanders described the two-week campaign as a simple, clear-cut triumph: The Taliban entrenched themselves in a swath of terrain, terrorizing local villagers; Canadian soldiers led a massive assault, killing more than 1,000 Taliban and routing others; and now villagers are welcoming the return of government rule. Military officials say the operation may have destroyed up to one third of the insurgency's hardcore ranks.
It's an inspiring tale, as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization calls on members for more troops and struggles to gain support for the war.
But interviews with tribal elders, farmers and senior officials in the city of Kandahar suggest a version of events that is more complicated, and less reassuring.
Related to this article
Many of the fighters killed — perhaps half of them, by one estimate — were not Taliban stalwarts, but local farmers who reportedly revolted against corrupt policing and tribal persecution. It appears the Taliban did not choose the Panjwai district as a battleground merely because the irrigation trenches and dry canals provided good hiding places, but because many villagers were willing to give them food, shelter — even sons for the fight — in exchange for freedom from the local authorities.
The government has regained control of this restive district southwest of Kandahar city, and has promised to muster donations from Canada and other countries to rebuild. The Canadian military says it will help local security forces establish a new base to make sure the Taliban do not return to Panjwai.
But there are troubling signs that the area may be sliding back toward the same conditions that sparked the violent revolt.
Unconfirmed reports suggest that Taliban fighters continue to lurk around the district, and that police in the area have resumed the abusive tactics that originally ignited local anger. Farmers say gangs of policemen, often their tribal rivals, have swept into Panjwai behind the Canadian troops to search for valuables. They have been described ransacking homes, burning shops and conducting shakedowns at checkpoints.
"This is a case of bad governance," said Talatbek Masadykov, head of the United Nations mission in southern Afghanistan.
"Maybe half of these so-called anti-government elements acting here in this area of the south, they had to join this Taliban movement because of the misbehaviour of these bad guys," Mr. Masadykov said, referring to undisciplined local police.
Police commanders in Kandahar city declined to be interviewed. The allegations from local farmers are difficult to confirm, because it has been only two days since Panjwai was deemed safe enough for civilians to return home, and the area remains too dangerous for Western journalists to visit.
But even politicians who generally support the government concede that the situation in Panjwai was aggravated by the missteps of local authorities.
The most notorious of the blunders was the case of Abdul Razik. Last month, concerned about the growing number of Taliban on the doorstep of Kandahar city, the provincial government assigned Mr. Razik to clear insurgents from Panjwai. Mr. Razik serves as a police commander in Spin Boldak, near the Pakistani border, but his fighters have a reputation as a kind of militia, all drawn from the same tribe: the Achakzai, a branch of the Pashtun ethnic group.
In the borderlands, the Achakzai often feud with another Pashtun tribe, the Noorzai. The two tribes also dominate the strip of farmland in Panjwai where Mr. Razik was dispatched, although the tribes have usually co-existed peacefully — until the arrival of Mr. Razik. Word spread quickly through Panjwai that the police commander intended to kill not only Taliban but any member of the Noorzai tribe; true or not, Mr. Razik soon found himself facing an armed uprising. His men were ambushed southwest of the village of Panjwai District Centre, and many of their bodies were left rotting on the road as Mr. Razik retreated to the borderlands.
But having fought off Mr. Razik, the local Noorzai tribesmen soon ended up fighting his more disciplined colleagues from the police and Afghan National Army.
"This was a bad idea, to bring Abdul Razik," said Haji Mohammed Qassam, a provincial council member in Kandahar with responsibility for security issues.
"One village had 10 or 20 fighters against the government before he came, and the next day, maybe 200."
It was only one example among many complaints cited by people from Panjwai as they described the deteriorating relations between locals and the government. Well before Mr. Razik's arrival, villagers say, they were subject to police stealing their cash, cellphones and watches. Even motorbikes and cars were seized by police patrols, locals say.
Abid, 32, a farmer from the Pashmul area, roughly 15 kilometres southwest of Kandahar, said the thievery by police got so frequent that his friend tried a novel tactic when he encountered a checkpoint two months ago.
Rolling toward a roadblock on a motorbike in the late evening, he said, his friend turned off the motor and started coasting toward the police.
"He took the keys out of the ignition and threw them into the bushes, so they couldn't steal it," Abid said. "This made them angry. They beat him, took his money and his watch. But he kept his bike."
The depredations stopped as the Taliban gained control of the area, villagers said. The insurgents imposed a strict order; some reports suggested they had returned to their habit of cutting off thieves' hands.
Abdul Ahad, 44, a wealthy farmer and landowner from the village of Sangisar, said he appreciated the Taliban, despite the terror he felt every time he passed through one of their checkpoints.
In a recent interview, Mr. Ahad removed a black leather diary from his *** pocket and showed a reporter where he had scribbled a few numbers for government officials. Those numbers could have got him killed, he said, if the Taliban had found the diary during their regular searches at checkpoints, because the fighters would have assumed he is a spy.
Still, risking death at the roadblocks was better, he said, than the random thievery and beatings meted out by the Afghan police.
"The Taliban didn't take any tolls at the checkposts," Mr. Ahad said. "Even when they came to my farm, they did not eat my grapes without permission."
The Taliban also endeared themselves to the locals by returning to their roots as a protest movement. The name Taliban first gained notoriety in Afghanistan in 1992, after a group of religious students started attacking the roadblocks in Panjwai to remove the corrupt jihadi commanders who once waged holy war against the Soviets but had settled into gangsterism after the Soviet withdrawal.
"Policemen [now] are like jihadi commanders in the past," said Mr. Masadykov, at the UN office in Kandahar.
"They are misbehaving sometimes, looting, going to search and at the same time stealing everything in the houses. We are receiving a lot of complaints about it. We have to work on it."
Mr. Qassam said the government has learned from its Panjwai experience and will try to avoid repeating it. Taliban are now infiltrating the Khakrez district, he said, but the government will try sending more disciplined Afghan forces to maintain order, rather than requesting an onslaught of NATO power.
Mr. Qassam also emphasized an aspect of NATO's story about Operation Medusa that few people in Kandahar question: The city itself now feels a little more secure.
The encroaching insurgency had left the educated city dwellers feeling unsafe. Housing prices, and even vehicle prices, were depressed in recent months. Some locals reported rental fees falling as much as ten times lower than last year's rates.
Merchants in the city were even sending packages of phone cards and cash to the Taliban in Panjwai, hoping to curry favour with the insurgents in case they overran the provincial capital, Mr. Qassam said.
"When the Taliban were in Panjwai, all the people in this area were worrying: 'Where will I move my family?'" Mr. Qassam said. "They are more relaxed and happy now."
--------- (an earlier report) -----------
The Sunday Times September 17, 2006
Key strike puts Taliban to flight
Michael Smith, Kandahar
BRITISH special forces have played a key role in a defeat of the Taliban as part of Operation Medusa, the largest combat operation ever mounted by Nato. Over
the past fortnight Nato troops, led by the Canadians, have driven the Taliban out of the strategically important Panjwayi district between Maiwand and
Kandahar.
Last week members of the newly formed British Special Forces Support Group (SFSG) pulled out of their hides to the southeast of Maiwand with their commanders satisfied that the Taliban had been defeated and expelled from the
area.
"They chose to take us on," said a senior Nato officer. "They have suffered heavy casualties. In fact, they haven't suffered such extensive casualties since
the fighting in 2001-02."
The British special forces had spent the first 10 days guarding against any Taliban reinforcement from the west, and the last few picking off fleeing insurgents. Senior officers cautioned that while Operation Medusa had been "a tactical success", there was no room for complacency and nobody was about to use the word victory. "It has a tendency to come back and bite you on the ***," one officer said.
This battlefield has a profound historical resonance. Maiwand was the scene of
one of the most devastating defeats ever suffered by the British when, in July 1880, 2,700 British and Indian troops were outnumbered 10 to one by Afghan tribesmen. More than 1,000 British and Indian troops died but 7,000 of the enemy were killed in what was a pyrrhic victory for the Afghans.
The British suffered losses in the latest battle - 14 dead when a Nimrod spyplane crashed on the first day, including signallers from the Special Boat Service (SBS) and the SFSG who were relaying intelligence collected by RAF colleagues. Five Canadian and two Afghan soldiers were killed on the ground. But Nato claimed that more than 500 Taliban - a third of those making a stand at Panjwayi - were killed.
The Taliban were using the area as a forward operations base to put pressure on the city of Kandahar, which is seen as the key to controlling the south. During the Soviet occupation of the 1980s, the mujaheddin occupied the area, which is covered with grapevines, wheat and poppy fields, making it an ideal supply base for an insurgent army. It is riddled with drainage ditches and high walled compounds providing perfect cover for a marauding guerrilla band and there are scores of escape tunnels and trenches built during the mujaheddin days.
General David Richards, the Nato commander, chose the area to demonstrate to the 70% of the population who, he believes, will back whoever appears stronger, that Nato and not the Taliban is in charge. Richards had prepared the ground
carefully. His commanders talked to tribal leaders to persuade the 40,000
population to leave for their own safety and to convince them that the
alliance would rebuild once the Taliban had left.
The battle, which pitted more than 2,000 troops against 1,500 Taliban, opened on Saturday September 2 with a salvo of gunfire from Canadian and Dutch artillery. A company of 150 men from the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry
advanced across the Arghandab river.
But the Taliban were lying in wait and the company took the brunt of their aggression, coming under intense mortar and machinegun fire that killed four
Canadians. The Canadian commander temporarily withdrew his forces and replaced them with Taskforce Grizzly, comprising 200 Afghan infantry backed up by US troops. On the left flank, Taskforce 31, comprising SBS and US Army Special Forces, were used temporarily to "shape the battlefield", seizing the initiative from the Taliban.
Two other companies of the Princess Patricia's were making slow progress against a Taliban trench system in the north. The third company was redirected to join the push, along with US infantry. They were backed up by direct fire support from Canadian and Dutch artillery and by air support from Apache attack helicopters, US B1 Lancer bombers, F16s, and US A10 Tankbusters - one
of which killed a fifth Canadian soldier with "friendly fire" - plus RAF Harrier GR7s.
While the SBS and the US Special Forces gave the Nato advance a kick-start from the south, other US special operations troops spread across the area to the south of the battlefield. They were ordered to keep out Taliban reinforcements and supply columns attempting to make their way along the desert roads from the Pakistani towns of Nuski and Quetta.
The UK and US special forces boosted the southern advance considerably and after a few days the SBS were withdrawn and reassigned to other tasks. To the north, the Canadians, whose light armoured vehicles were vulnerable to rocket- propelled grenades, were struggling. By the beginning of last week, an operation scheduled to last only 10 days looked like lasting a month.
But sustained aerial and artillery bombardment were beginning to tell on the Taliban. Suddenly one company of the Princess Patricia's made a breakthrough, pushing forward to hold a position well ahead of the Canadian lines. A second company pushed forward and very soon all three Canadian companies were leap-frogging each other to the point that the American infantry could be withdrawn.
The effect was like a vice, squeezing the Taliban out to the west where
they were awaited by Dutch infantry, a Danish armoured reconnaissance
company and, further out towards Maiwand, the British SFSG, mostly former
paratroopers. By the end of last week, the vast majority of the Taliban
were thought to have fled.
Senior Nato officers expressed astonishment that the Taliban had abandoned traditional guerrilla tactics that would have seen them dispersing the minute heavy artillery and aerial firepower were introduced. "The next three to six months is a crucial period here," Richards said. "We are establishing psychological ascendency over the Taliban in Panjwayi. "Operation Medusa has not been about killing for no reason. The people there want to believe we can win and we're
beginning to demonstrate that we will win."
Published Tuesday, September 26, 2006 8:04 AM
Comments
JC Rawley said:
Clearly the world is much more complex than the black/white (or black hats/white hats) version that our Administration keeps repeating like a mantra repeated over and over in some sort of prayer ritual.
The fact is that many of the "terrorists" caught during the original invasion of Afghanistan (and now in Guantanamo or one of the secret CIA prisons) were fighting corruption as in the first case or even shopped out by local warlords as "tribute" to the new invaders to show their loyalty to the new regime.
Afghanistan is probably the poorest country in the world. It seems to have no minerals or even oil to offer the people some sort of respite from the opium growers that seem to bethe only chance at financial independence for the average person.
The Taliban may have been awful people but they had great PR in their country for "doing good" or at least "doing different" from the old regimes.
If we want to defeat the Taliban and their supporters, it will not be done by bombings and massacres alone.
I recommend the Thomas PM Barnett books on the New Pentagon's Map and Bridging the Gap . They will offer, as Col. Hammes book did, a great insight into how we might win more peaces instead of winning wars and losing the peace.
September 26, 2006 10:27 AM
membrain said:
With respect to the article published in the Globe and Mail you have to realize that they have an far left wing anti-war agenda the makes the New York Times look like Neo-Cons!! They are not a credible source for reporting from Afghanistan.
The Britsh Arcticle was the more accurate of the two. The idea that the locals liked the Taliban is pure bulls***! Thes are people that use to hold public executions for such 'crimes' as not having a long enough beard.
September 26, 2006 12:42 PM
JC Rawley said:
Sorry membrain,
The Globe and Mail, Canada's National Newspaper, has a distinctly Right of center point of view.
It is by no means a left wing paper.
It is reporting things you do not like therefore you call it a name.
BTW, the NY Times is one of Bush's biggest supporters. They helped him sell the war and continue to report and support it as one of his better "accomplishments".
Perhaps it is time people put down the Kool-aid and look at the pig with lipstick for what it truly is.
September 26, 2006 1:14 PM
Gary VW said:
A persons "truth" is primarily derived from ones own perceptions.
If all the info that was given to the reporter(s) was factual, & not misconstrued, or reformatted, in any manner, then both stories have some "truth" in them.
September 26, 2006 2:55 PM
CPT Thomas C. Nield said:
I am an Information Operations Officer for TF Aegis (RC-S) and was involved with the planning of Op Medusa. Graeme Smith's article is pretty accurate. The locals of Panjwayi offered support for the Taliban because local governance was corrupt.
As an officer with access to classified material, I have to say that both articles are pretty accurate. I am surprised that the SF involvement (especially British SF) was mentioned because the first rule of fight club is that you don't talk about fight club.
Anyway, the area of Panjwayi is key terrain. It controls access to Kandahar City from the west and it is the only defendable area near Kandahar City. The Russians lost an entire division in the Pashmul area of Panjwayi. NATO forces achieved what the Russians could not.
Op Medusa established the security credentials of ISAF/NATO, the challenge now is Phase 4, Reconstruction. We are trying to get aid in there and to shore up a previously non-existent credible security presence (Afghan and NATO).
Myself and my boss, a Canadian Major, personally escorted media to Pashmul to witness the aid distributions and to give them the opportunity to interview the locals. Graeme Smith elected to not go because he typically likes to interview locals without military guys around. Carlotta Gall (NY Times), Susanne Koelbl (Der Spiegel), Declan Walsh (the Guardian), and Jim (Canadian Broadcasting Co) did go and got the interviews with Grizzly 6 and the locals that they wanted.
The articles Graeme Smith produces are pretty accurate most of the time. He works really hard at getting the locals to open up. Sometimes what he writes causes a little heartburn but we know that he isn't being malicious. Sometimes the truth hurts.
September 26, 2006 3:40 PM
ted mauro said:
I am EXTREMEMLY pleased with both these articles and this site. We need to look at all sources to make the best choices so all our troops can be safe and all our decisions correct. While this isn't always possible it should ever remain our goal for the leaders and the voters of our GREAT nation. Thank you for this service.
September 26, 2006 6:23 PM
ON Point said:
Ted -- Thanks for your kind words about the site. Means a lot to us. We'll keep working to bring you all this important information so that our citizens and warriors can stay proud, strong, and free... and well-informed.
September 26, 2006 9:46 PM
Gary VW said:
Actually Membrain was correct. The "Globe & Mail" a newspaper, I believed based out of Toronto & has a large distribution in several other canadian cities. Now, has a leftist leaning view on its articles, even though its original start was from a conservative (called Tory's in Canada) group.
So, if you read both stories above, remembering that one story leans to the right, & the other to the left, you can find the truth written in both articles, & you can see how the reporters want to guide the reader into seeing the story, from their point of view.
September 27, 2006 8:38 AM
CPT Thomas C. Nield said:
I want to reiterate that both articles are factually correct. There is no left or right leaning. One article focuses on the maneuver part of Op Medusa, the other article is getting local reaction.
The local reaction is spot on. The lack of credible local governance is what led to Op Medusa in the first place and now we are trying to get a credible ANSF and ISAF presence to stay for the long term.
GRaeme Smith ended his article with a good quote from Mr. Qassam. The Kandaharis are in fact breathing easier now that ISAF/NATO has proven that they can stick it to the Taliban.
September 28, 2006 12:29 AM
ON Point said:
CPT Nield,
Thanks for checking back on this link and for confirming the facts on the ground. As mentioned in the initial post, our intent at ON Point is not to play "gotcha", but to raise questions when things don't seem to make sense.
If there's any important information we can ever assist you with distributing, please don't hesitate to contact us directly using the links on the page.
September 28, 2006 11:12 AM
http://uscavonpoint.com/blogs/reconstructing_iraq/archive/2006/09/26/173.aspx
Thursday, September 14, 2006
Canadian Forces Deal Taliban Another Blow in Kandahar
Operation Medusa nets another 186 Taliban; initial report of bombmaking cell in Kabul confirmed
The Taliban in the Panjwai district west of Kandahar City have suffered another round of massive casualties. The Royal Canadian Regiment, combined with Coalition air power, killed 186 Taliban fighters dug into fixed positions in the Pashmul region during two sperate engagements, bringing the nine day total of over 510 Taliban killed and 80 captured in 8 days of Operation Medusa. These are massive losses for a Taliban force estimated at around 10,000 fighters (12,000 by the Taliban's own count). The Canadian Army has suffered 5 killed in combat of the course of the week.
Elements of the Royal Canadian Regiment are now digging into the Panjwai and Zhari districts, indicating they will remain in the region. This will benefit the military situation in the short term by allowing for more flexibility and a permanent security presence in region, as well as facilitate the reconstruction mission in the future, an important component in restoring stability in the region.
In the past three days since the above action, the RCR has captured 65% of the region while meeting little to no resistance. The Taliban have run away. Formerly, according to Bill Roggio, the Taliban were fighting at the company and platoon level.
What does this mean? Well it would have been better had they stood their ground and let us kill them. But having them cut and run will hurt their reputation in the eyes of the people of Afghanistan.
More importantly, they left behind; intelligence, weapons, medicine, and ammunition all of which are of great value to terrorists. There is a distinct element of fear associated with their a running away. Fear is contagious. God bless The Royal Canadian Regiment. Death to the Taliban. (I've always wanted to say that.)
With files from http://billroggio.com/
The Taliban in the Panjwai district west of Kandahar City have suffered another round of massive casualties. The Royal Canadian Regiment, combined with Coalition air power, killed 186 Taliban fighters dug into fixed positions in the Pashmul region during two sperate engagements, bringing the nine day total of over 510 Taliban killed and 80 captured in 8 days of Operation Medusa. These are massive losses for a Taliban force estimated at around 10,000 fighters (12,000 by the Taliban's own count). The Canadian Army has suffered 5 killed in combat of the course of the week.
Elements of the Royal Canadian Regiment are now digging into the Panjwai and Zhari districts, indicating they will remain in the region. This will benefit the military situation in the short term by allowing for more flexibility and a permanent security presence in region, as well as facilitate the reconstruction mission in the future, an important component in restoring stability in the region.
In the past three days since the above action, the RCR has captured 65% of the region while meeting little to no resistance. The Taliban have run away. Formerly, according to Bill Roggio, the Taliban were fighting at the company and platoon level.
What does this mean? Well it would have been better had they stood their ground and let us kill them. But having them cut and run will hurt their reputation in the eyes of the people of Afghanistan.
More importantly, they left behind; intelligence, weapons, medicine, and ammunition all of which are of great value to terrorists. There is a distinct element of fear associated with their a running away. Fear is contagious. God bless The Royal Canadian Regiment. Death to the Taliban. (I've always wanted to say that.)
With files from http://billroggio.com/
Tuesday, July 11, 2006
SGT. Tim Boggs' Interview With an Iraqi General
I've written before about this fine young American Soldier on his second voluntary tour of Iraq. His Mission is to get the word out about the situation on the ground that the MSM won't. Here are his two part interviews:
Part II: Interview With An Iraqi General
This is the second part of my interview with General Ali. As before I hope you share this interview with as many people as you can because all people need to hear the truth coming out of Iraq.
Do you think your soldiers have learned from American soldiers?
General Ali: Yes they have learned from the soldiers and so have I. I learned many things from the coalition forces.
What do you see as problems for the Iraqi army right now?
General Ali: The Iraqi army does not have clear leaders right now. This is bad. The coalition also supplies everything for us right now and the Iraqi government does not supply anything for us. We get fuel and uniforms from the coalition, but we do not have leaders checking what we need for the future.
When the Americans leave what will happen?
General Ali: No problem we will be able to take care of ourselves.
What would you say to the American people who think it was a bad idea for us to come to Iraq and whom think we should leave now?
General Ali: This message is from the terrorists. The terrorists encourage the media and they encourage the U.S. people. The U.S. soldiers who came to Iraq are heroes. The media do not convey the real picture of what the US soldiers are doing. Our problem from the very beginning has been the media. They think the U.S. soldiers just came to fight the Iraqi people. After this interview we will go to Qayyarah and help the people. We will talk with the people and do things for them. The U.S. media only show the bad to the U.S. people. And also the U.S. media is very bad, they are against the US people because they make sure only to show the bad and not the good of what the US heroes do here. They help the Iraqi people, they make projects, they make the Iraqi army and police, and make jobs here but the media does not show this. They only show car bombs, and they even change digital pictures to show Americans attacking Iraqi families (Haditha). The US people only see the bad they don’t see Qayyarah, only the dangerous areas. They did not see how the US soldiers shop in our market and meet the people and help the kids. They don’t see how the soldiers give gifts to the kids. The media do not show this, or how they do projects for schools, water, and roads. They only show the units that fight the bad guys and do not show the other units. This is a big problem. We fight the terrorists, and the terrorists are not just against the Iraqis but also against the whole world, all humans.
I want to say first hello to all the US people and second I need their trust and for them to encourage their soldiers who help us fight and also to encourage the Iraqi people. We need them to encourage the soldiers to do projects to help us. Encourage them to have a trust between them and the Iraqi people because we have a good future. Third I need them to believe me that the terrorists are down in Iraq. I only see terrorists on Al Jazerra, where are the terrorists? Show them to me! I go to Mosul by myself-no bad guys. I need to see terrorists. I have not been attacked in three years, except for once in April of last year and he only killed himself and did not hurt me. Where are the bad guys? We need the American people to know the truth.
Please tell the American people the terrorists are down. When we killed Zarqawi where were the media? They did not report on it. Where is Zarqawi?
At this point in the interview General Ali began speaking Arabic after my interpreter interrupted by saying Zarqawi went to hell. General Ali said in Arabic that Zarqawi went to the “historical trash bin.” Sounds good to me.
Do you think Iraq will look favorably upon American soldiers and what we have done here?
General Ali: This depends on the leaders of Iraq. If the leaders are good men and do good things for the Iraqi people then the people will believe him when he tells them about the Americans, they will trust him. But if we have bad leaders the people will not believe him. But if I work with the coalition and help make projects for the people then they will believe us. We will tell them “Look the terrorists destroyed all of these things, they killed civilians. But look at what the coalition did. They helped us.”
This picture will come in the future. We work to serve the people. God willing the story will be told right in the future about how the coalition helped the civilians. I am happy about our future and I think it is an excellent future.
What do you do for fun if you always work?
General Ali: I go home two days a month to see my family. I change the times I go home though. I do not have time to lie around. I see my family. I have 11 kids and one wife. I tried to get two wives but that didn’t work (chuckles).
Do you think it is a good idea for IA soldiers to protect their own villages and cities?
General Ali: Right now yes but not in the future. The U.S. army is from all over not just from Washington. We need to be like that. The most important thing now though is to encourage the people from the towns to protect their own towns. When the security becomes good we will change. We will send different units to different places. You can move my battalion to Basra, to Baquba, to Ramadi, to Nasariyah with no problem, just like the American army. But right now we keep the soldiers in their own area because their own people help them to find terrorists. Right now we do not have a real army. Right now we just find the terrorists. A real army comes from all the people.
Do you think Arabs and Kurds can work together?
Yes I have Kurdish and Arab soldiers in my battalion. We can work with Sunnis and Shiites no problem. We are one people and one army. My tribe is the military. I serve my country and do not wish to split up the army.
At this point I read to General Ali a note given to my by The Real Ugly American who asked me to share with him. The note is as follows:
“Americans support the people of Iraq. We want them to live in safety and freedom. When we hear news of Iraqis being killed our hearts break the same as when American soldiers are killed. People we love are fighting and dying beside you and your men. Do not throw away this precious opportunity that so few people in the world are given. History is calling on you and your men. Freedom needs you to be strong. The people of Iraq need you to be strong. The world needs you and your men to be heroes. May God bless you and your men”.
General Ali responded by saying “this is our hope too. My wishes and regards for this person and I am very hopeful for the future. I am sure we will get the victory”. He then asked me to ask him why Iraq is going to win against the terrorists.
Sgt. Boggs: Why are you going to win against the terrorists?
General Ali: Cause where are the terrorists!? Show me the terrorists!
At the end of the interview General Ali told me that the soldiers in his battalion call him “The Old Brother” because not only is he their commander but because he is a brother to them. After talking with this great man I understand why he is called “The Old Brother” because I feel that we are suddenly not so different anymore. He may be an older man who speaks a different language and lives on the other side of the world but we both yearn for freedom and are willing to give our lives for others. General Ali has my utmost respect because he is a lone beacon for hope in the midst of so many enemies of all faces that want to see him fail. He has single handedly changed the face of his town and given hope to all Iraqis that it is possible to stand up in the face of evil and prevail. If only there were more men like him in this world.
posted by T. F. Boggs at 1:09 AM 69 comments
Sunday, July 02, 2006
Interview With An Iraqi General
I wrote a story for Michael Yon’s Frontline Forum a week ago about the town I am stationed in right now named Qayyarah. Qayyarah is a model for other Iraqi cities because it was once a haven for terrorists but is now safe enough for anyone to travel around in without fear of terrorists. The main reason for the safety of Qayyarah lies with one man: General Ali. He is a myth-like figure around our base and everyone knows his name. He is a strict military man but is the type of man Iraq needs so desperately right now. I hope people the world over will read this interview and learn just what kind of men are in Iraq right now willing to take control of their own country. What follows is the truth. It comes directly from the mouth of a man who knows intimately what is going on in Iraq and knows where Iraq has come from and where it needs to go. I intend to post the interview in two installments due to the length and urge everyone to bookmark this page and come back for the rest of the interview.
How long have you been in the military?
General Ali: I first went to the army in 1976, I became a staff brigade general in 1997. In 2001 I left the army because there were many problems between my tribe and Saddam’s regime. He fired many of the officers and put some of them in jail. I am one of the officers who was put in jail for ten months and afterwards I was put out of the army. When the coalition forces came to Iraq in 2003 I worked with the 101st (Airborne American army unit) in Qayyarah (*the town I am in now and where he lives) as an advisor. In 2004 the terrorists destroyed all of the Iraqi police stations and in that time the terrorists controlled all of this area. They controlled Mosul, south Mosul, and 40 km from where we are now. In that time no one came to help. All of the people and soldiers were scared and went home. I came to help and the Americans invited me to come command this battalion. The name of this battalion was the 102nd ING before they changed the name to the 1st battalion 3 brigade Iraqi army. At that time I only had eight soldiers with my battalion. They could not go out in their uniforms because they were scared of the terrorists. If they went out on a mission with the coalition they wore facemasks because if the terrorists saw them they would kill them. First time I started training my soldiers I made 1000 soldiers in my unit. After one month I went out on a mission with them and captured all of the terrorists leaders.
At this point I asked kind of jokingly, kind of seriously “Really, on the first time out?” He replied in all seriousness:
Yes the first time.
I worked day and night, 24 hours 7 days a week to clean my area because my area at that time was very dangerous. No one could move at that time, no market, no police, no Iraqi army. We continue to work with the Americans, we captured many bad guys, more than 800. We found caches we found mortars, many weapons. They attacked my house many times. They did not send messages to me but instead sent car bombs and mortars to my family. But I did not stop my mission. I encouraged my family but I did not go home. For three months I did not see my family, I stayed with the coalition to serve my country because my country needed me.
I was in this same position as battalion commander in 1987 during the war between Iraq and Iran which started in 1980-88. In that war I was injured 7 times and have 17 medals for courage. I did not go to Kuwait in 1991 because I did not believe in the old regime and also my tribe did not believe the old regime. He killed many people in my tribe from the military. But now that all the people believe me they work with me and help me.
As two local Sheiks sit across the room from us listening in on our conversation General Ali turns the conversation to them for a minute.
You see those two sheiks? They came to thank me because I made their area secure. They are very happy when they see the work being done in their area. When they see people working at night, people driving. Basra and Baghdad are dangerous but my area now is very safe. In my area the security is excellent. Now I can guarantee that you can go by yourself in your uniform with no armor, no helmet, no weapon, and I’ll give you my vehicle so that you can go to Qayyarah to shop in the market and come back to here and you will be safe. This happened because before the terrorists were in control there was no trust between the Iraqi army and the people. They just believed the terrorists but when I came I controlled this area and I had a meeting with all the sheiks and all the people and all the doctors and I made clear to them that all the terrorists and all the criminals were killers against Islam and they believed me and helped me. They gave me information and even caught terrorists and brought them to me. This is excellent. I told them that it was their job, that it was their country. All Iraqi people must fight the terrorists because it was not just the job of the Iraqi army. The terrorists were killing civilians and because of it the people believed me and they came to work with me.
How did Saddam treat you since you were in a different tribe than him?
General Ali: He was a bad guy against all of the Iraqi people not just my tribe.
Have you liked working with the American soldiers?
General Ali: Yes, yes, yes. They believe me and I believe them. All the soldiers that have worked here know General Ali. I invite them to my house to eat with me and to train with me. I know they came to help the Iraqi people. That is why I work with them, that is why I tell my people the truth about the coalition. Before they might have disliked the US army because they did not have the real picture of the soldiers. I told the people though how the US army fought for us and also how they did projects for us. They fixed the schools, made roads, and made many things for the people of Iraq. The people see how we caught the terrorists, how we made it safe, they see that is more comfortable then under Saddam’s regime.
Do you have a different picture of Americans now then before we came?
General Ali: It is the same for me because I know exactly why the soldiers came to Iraq. I am not a small officer (*Just incase: Brigadier General is a high rank in any army). I work with the soldiers day and night. If you work with people for three years you get to know them. You see them more than your family. You work with them more than your brother. I believe and like the soldiers. If they make mistakes I tell them because they are my friends. If they don’t know about the Iraqi people I tell them. I am a soldier and an advisor. Sometimes the soldiers did not know about the Iraqi people. I also told my friends about the soldiers: how they speak, how they shake hands, how they sit down with them. Which subject they speak on because I know the US army soldiers read before they came over here. When they came to help though they needed advisors. If there were other good advisors like me then there wouldn’t be terrorists. My people help me because they believe in me and like me. And when the terrorists came they did not believe the terrorists, they fought against the terrorists. When the terrorists came from Mosul, Ramadi, and from any other town the people would call me on my cell phone and tell me about them.
At this time in the conversation I mentioned to General Ali about the day before when I saw him coming in the main gate to our base with three terrorists in the back of a truck. He laughed and told me he received a tip from some locals and he and his men dropped everything they were doing and went out to catch the men. They were assisted by an American helicopter in the capture, which made it a combined effort. He explained to me that those same sequences of events happen often and exuded confidence in the efforts of his men and of his fellow townspeople.
The rest of the interview will be posted on Wednesday. In the second part of the interview General Ali shares his feelings about the American media, the future of the Iraqi army, and shares some words for the American people. Please spread the word about this interview. I believe what General Ali has to say needs to be heard by the whole world.
http://boredsoldier.blogspot.com/
Part II: Interview With An Iraqi General
This is the second part of my interview with General Ali. As before I hope you share this interview with as many people as you can because all people need to hear the truth coming out of Iraq.
Do you think your soldiers have learned from American soldiers?
General Ali: Yes they have learned from the soldiers and so have I. I learned many things from the coalition forces.
What do you see as problems for the Iraqi army right now?
General Ali: The Iraqi army does not have clear leaders right now. This is bad. The coalition also supplies everything for us right now and the Iraqi government does not supply anything for us. We get fuel and uniforms from the coalition, but we do not have leaders checking what we need for the future.
When the Americans leave what will happen?
General Ali: No problem we will be able to take care of ourselves.
What would you say to the American people who think it was a bad idea for us to come to Iraq and whom think we should leave now?
General Ali: This message is from the terrorists. The terrorists encourage the media and they encourage the U.S. people. The U.S. soldiers who came to Iraq are heroes. The media do not convey the real picture of what the US soldiers are doing. Our problem from the very beginning has been the media. They think the U.S. soldiers just came to fight the Iraqi people. After this interview we will go to Qayyarah and help the people. We will talk with the people and do things for them. The U.S. media only show the bad to the U.S. people. And also the U.S. media is very bad, they are against the US people because they make sure only to show the bad and not the good of what the US heroes do here. They help the Iraqi people, they make projects, they make the Iraqi army and police, and make jobs here but the media does not show this. They only show car bombs, and they even change digital pictures to show Americans attacking Iraqi families (Haditha). The US people only see the bad they don’t see Qayyarah, only the dangerous areas. They did not see how the US soldiers shop in our market and meet the people and help the kids. They don’t see how the soldiers give gifts to the kids. The media do not show this, or how they do projects for schools, water, and roads. They only show the units that fight the bad guys and do not show the other units. This is a big problem. We fight the terrorists, and the terrorists are not just against the Iraqis but also against the whole world, all humans.
I want to say first hello to all the US people and second I need their trust and for them to encourage their soldiers who help us fight and also to encourage the Iraqi people. We need them to encourage the soldiers to do projects to help us. Encourage them to have a trust between them and the Iraqi people because we have a good future. Third I need them to believe me that the terrorists are down in Iraq. I only see terrorists on Al Jazerra, where are the terrorists? Show them to me! I go to Mosul by myself-no bad guys. I need to see terrorists. I have not been attacked in three years, except for once in April of last year and he only killed himself and did not hurt me. Where are the bad guys? We need the American people to know the truth.
Please tell the American people the terrorists are down. When we killed Zarqawi where were the media? They did not report on it. Where is Zarqawi?
At this point in the interview General Ali began speaking Arabic after my interpreter interrupted by saying Zarqawi went to hell. General Ali said in Arabic that Zarqawi went to the “historical trash bin.” Sounds good to me.
Do you think Iraq will look favorably upon American soldiers and what we have done here?
General Ali: This depends on the leaders of Iraq. If the leaders are good men and do good things for the Iraqi people then the people will believe him when he tells them about the Americans, they will trust him. But if we have bad leaders the people will not believe him. But if I work with the coalition and help make projects for the people then they will believe us. We will tell them “Look the terrorists destroyed all of these things, they killed civilians. But look at what the coalition did. They helped us.”
This picture will come in the future. We work to serve the people. God willing the story will be told right in the future about how the coalition helped the civilians. I am happy about our future and I think it is an excellent future.
What do you do for fun if you always work?
General Ali: I go home two days a month to see my family. I change the times I go home though. I do not have time to lie around. I see my family. I have 11 kids and one wife. I tried to get two wives but that didn’t work (chuckles).
Do you think it is a good idea for IA soldiers to protect their own villages and cities?
General Ali: Right now yes but not in the future. The U.S. army is from all over not just from Washington. We need to be like that. The most important thing now though is to encourage the people from the towns to protect their own towns. When the security becomes good we will change. We will send different units to different places. You can move my battalion to Basra, to Baquba, to Ramadi, to Nasariyah with no problem, just like the American army. But right now we keep the soldiers in their own area because their own people help them to find terrorists. Right now we do not have a real army. Right now we just find the terrorists. A real army comes from all the people.
Do you think Arabs and Kurds can work together?
Yes I have Kurdish and Arab soldiers in my battalion. We can work with Sunnis and Shiites no problem. We are one people and one army. My tribe is the military. I serve my country and do not wish to split up the army.
At this point I read to General Ali a note given to my by The Real Ugly American who asked me to share with him. The note is as follows:
“Americans support the people of Iraq. We want them to live in safety and freedom. When we hear news of Iraqis being killed our hearts break the same as when American soldiers are killed. People we love are fighting and dying beside you and your men. Do not throw away this precious opportunity that so few people in the world are given. History is calling on you and your men. Freedom needs you to be strong. The people of Iraq need you to be strong. The world needs you and your men to be heroes. May God bless you and your men”.
General Ali responded by saying “this is our hope too. My wishes and regards for this person and I am very hopeful for the future. I am sure we will get the victory”. He then asked me to ask him why Iraq is going to win against the terrorists.
Sgt. Boggs: Why are you going to win against the terrorists?
General Ali: Cause where are the terrorists!? Show me the terrorists!
At the end of the interview General Ali told me that the soldiers in his battalion call him “The Old Brother” because not only is he their commander but because he is a brother to them. After talking with this great man I understand why he is called “The Old Brother” because I feel that we are suddenly not so different anymore. He may be an older man who speaks a different language and lives on the other side of the world but we both yearn for freedom and are willing to give our lives for others. General Ali has my utmost respect because he is a lone beacon for hope in the midst of so many enemies of all faces that want to see him fail. He has single handedly changed the face of his town and given hope to all Iraqis that it is possible to stand up in the face of evil and prevail. If only there were more men like him in this world.
posted by T. F. Boggs at 1:09 AM 69 comments
Sunday, July 02, 2006
Interview With An Iraqi General
I wrote a story for Michael Yon’s Frontline Forum a week ago about the town I am stationed in right now named Qayyarah. Qayyarah is a model for other Iraqi cities because it was once a haven for terrorists but is now safe enough for anyone to travel around in without fear of terrorists. The main reason for the safety of Qayyarah lies with one man: General Ali. He is a myth-like figure around our base and everyone knows his name. He is a strict military man but is the type of man Iraq needs so desperately right now. I hope people the world over will read this interview and learn just what kind of men are in Iraq right now willing to take control of their own country. What follows is the truth. It comes directly from the mouth of a man who knows intimately what is going on in Iraq and knows where Iraq has come from and where it needs to go. I intend to post the interview in two installments due to the length and urge everyone to bookmark this page and come back for the rest of the interview.
How long have you been in the military?
General Ali: I first went to the army in 1976, I became a staff brigade general in 1997. In 2001 I left the army because there were many problems between my tribe and Saddam’s regime. He fired many of the officers and put some of them in jail. I am one of the officers who was put in jail for ten months and afterwards I was put out of the army. When the coalition forces came to Iraq in 2003 I worked with the 101st (Airborne American army unit) in Qayyarah (*the town I am in now and where he lives) as an advisor. In 2004 the terrorists destroyed all of the Iraqi police stations and in that time the terrorists controlled all of this area. They controlled Mosul, south Mosul, and 40 km from where we are now. In that time no one came to help. All of the people and soldiers were scared and went home. I came to help and the Americans invited me to come command this battalion. The name of this battalion was the 102nd ING before they changed the name to the 1st battalion 3 brigade Iraqi army. At that time I only had eight soldiers with my battalion. They could not go out in their uniforms because they were scared of the terrorists. If they went out on a mission with the coalition they wore facemasks because if the terrorists saw them they would kill them. First time I started training my soldiers I made 1000 soldiers in my unit. After one month I went out on a mission with them and captured all of the terrorists leaders.
At this point I asked kind of jokingly, kind of seriously “Really, on the first time out?” He replied in all seriousness:
Yes the first time.
I worked day and night, 24 hours 7 days a week to clean my area because my area at that time was very dangerous. No one could move at that time, no market, no police, no Iraqi army. We continue to work with the Americans, we captured many bad guys, more than 800. We found caches we found mortars, many weapons. They attacked my house many times. They did not send messages to me but instead sent car bombs and mortars to my family. But I did not stop my mission. I encouraged my family but I did not go home. For three months I did not see my family, I stayed with the coalition to serve my country because my country needed me.
I was in this same position as battalion commander in 1987 during the war between Iraq and Iran which started in 1980-88. In that war I was injured 7 times and have 17 medals for courage. I did not go to Kuwait in 1991 because I did not believe in the old regime and also my tribe did not believe the old regime. He killed many people in my tribe from the military. But now that all the people believe me they work with me and help me.
As two local Sheiks sit across the room from us listening in on our conversation General Ali turns the conversation to them for a minute.
You see those two sheiks? They came to thank me because I made their area secure. They are very happy when they see the work being done in their area. When they see people working at night, people driving. Basra and Baghdad are dangerous but my area now is very safe. In my area the security is excellent. Now I can guarantee that you can go by yourself in your uniform with no armor, no helmet, no weapon, and I’ll give you my vehicle so that you can go to Qayyarah to shop in the market and come back to here and you will be safe. This happened because before the terrorists were in control there was no trust between the Iraqi army and the people. They just believed the terrorists but when I came I controlled this area and I had a meeting with all the sheiks and all the people and all the doctors and I made clear to them that all the terrorists and all the criminals were killers against Islam and they believed me and helped me. They gave me information and even caught terrorists and brought them to me. This is excellent. I told them that it was their job, that it was their country. All Iraqi people must fight the terrorists because it was not just the job of the Iraqi army. The terrorists were killing civilians and because of it the people believed me and they came to work with me.
How did Saddam treat you since you were in a different tribe than him?
General Ali: He was a bad guy against all of the Iraqi people not just my tribe.
Have you liked working with the American soldiers?
General Ali: Yes, yes, yes. They believe me and I believe them. All the soldiers that have worked here know General Ali. I invite them to my house to eat with me and to train with me. I know they came to help the Iraqi people. That is why I work with them, that is why I tell my people the truth about the coalition. Before they might have disliked the US army because they did not have the real picture of the soldiers. I told the people though how the US army fought for us and also how they did projects for us. They fixed the schools, made roads, and made many things for the people of Iraq. The people see how we caught the terrorists, how we made it safe, they see that is more comfortable then under Saddam’s regime.
Do you have a different picture of Americans now then before we came?
General Ali: It is the same for me because I know exactly why the soldiers came to Iraq. I am not a small officer (*Just incase: Brigadier General is a high rank in any army). I work with the soldiers day and night. If you work with people for three years you get to know them. You see them more than your family. You work with them more than your brother. I believe and like the soldiers. If they make mistakes I tell them because they are my friends. If they don’t know about the Iraqi people I tell them. I am a soldier and an advisor. Sometimes the soldiers did not know about the Iraqi people. I also told my friends about the soldiers: how they speak, how they shake hands, how they sit down with them. Which subject they speak on because I know the US army soldiers read before they came over here. When they came to help though they needed advisors. If there were other good advisors like me then there wouldn’t be terrorists. My people help me because they believe in me and like me. And when the terrorists came they did not believe the terrorists, they fought against the terrorists. When the terrorists came from Mosul, Ramadi, and from any other town the people would call me on my cell phone and tell me about them.
At this time in the conversation I mentioned to General Ali about the day before when I saw him coming in the main gate to our base with three terrorists in the back of a truck. He laughed and told me he received a tip from some locals and he and his men dropped everything they were doing and went out to catch the men. They were assisted by an American helicopter in the capture, which made it a combined effort. He explained to me that those same sequences of events happen often and exuded confidence in the efforts of his men and of his fellow townspeople.
The rest of the interview will be posted on Wednesday. In the second part of the interview General Ali shares his feelings about the American media, the future of the Iraqi army, and shares some words for the American people. Please spread the word about this interview. I believe what General Ali has to say needs to be heard by the whole world.
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